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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE
Monday June 28, 1976
Cl NIDC 76-151C
DIA review(s) completed.
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Monday, June 28, 19 76.
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The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing
senior US otticials .
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PORTUGAL
Portuguese army chief Antonio Ramalho Eanes won a
lands iide victory over his three opponents in the presidential
election yesterday. There will be no need for a run-off election.
Eanes won more than 60 percent of the vote. Far left
candidate Otelo de Carvalho placed second with about 17 percent
and Prime Minister Azevedo received some 14 percent. Communist
Party candidate Octavio Pato was fourth with 8 percent.
Eanes had the backing and organizational assistance
of the three major political parties — the Socialists, the cen-
trist Popular Democrats, and the conservative Social Democratic
Center. Together, these parties accounted for 75 percent of the
vote in the legislative election in April. Eanes received less
than that amount in part because of the low voter turnout yes-
terday; about 73 percent of the voters went to the polls as
compared with 83 percent in April.
Some voters were unsure of Eanes' political views.
The array chief has generally been considered to be conservative,
and much of his campaign rhetoric advocated a return to law and
order and solving Portugal's serious economic problems through
hard work by all citizens.
At the same time, however, Eanes endorsed a Portuguese
Prand ot socialism and agrarian reform policies that raised
suspicions among more conservative party and military backers.
Despite some defections from the Popular Democrats and the So-
cial Democratic Center, the parties decided there was no better
candidate .
The parties believe Eanes has the best chance to
maintain discipline in the military during his five-year term
and to ensure the support of the armed forces for Portugal's
still fragile democratic institutions.
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Carvalho apparently picked up as much as half of the
votes that had gone to the Communist Party in the election in
April. Carvalho reportedly matched Banes' vote in several left-
ist strongholds in the south, but Banes pulled 70 to 90 percent
of the votes in many districts in the more conservative north.
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USSR-POLAND
[ Poland apparently was quiet over the weekend in the
wake ot the regime's retraction on Friday of the sharp food
price hikes proposed the day before.
[ Polish television on Saturday night did acknowledge
that "hooligans" had looted factories and shops in two cities
near Warsaw, but asserted that workers were holding rallies in
support of the government and party chief Gierek throughout the
country and that telegrams criticizing the looters were pouring
into party headquarters.
Ihs Polish news agency, in an English-language re-
j.ease , has cited a large number of Western media commentaries
on the economic necessity of the price increases now deferred.
Among the media of Poland's allies, only Bulgarian radio's do-
mestic service appears to have noted the Polish acknowledgement
of unrest.
Approvec
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Radio Moscow's domestic service confined itself to
reporting that Warsaw had decided to "reanalyze" the "problem
of price increases as a result of "discussions" through out the
country .
SEYCHELLES
The Seychelles, a British crown colony in the Indian
Ocean, oecomes independent at midnight. The archipelago, with
a population of 60,000 on some 80 islands, has had internal
self-government since 1967.
I Under the independence agreement negotiated last
winter , three small islands that London detached from the
Seychelles in 1965 and included in the British Indian Ocean
Territory are being returned to the Seychelles.
I The new nation starts off with a two-party^ coalition
government headed by 37— year— old James Mancham, who has been
prime minister and will now become president. He retains con-
trol of foreign affairs and the small police force.
, Mancham founded the dominant Seychelles Democratic
Party in 'l964; it mostly represents the interests of the
country's established groups, especially its "first families.
Despite a well-deserved reputation as a playboy, Mancham has
demonstrated considerable political skill, proving himself
particularly adept at pre-empting popular issues from his
political opponents.
.The head of the junior party in the coalition, 40-
year-old France Albert Rene, will become prime minister. As
opposition leader before the coalition was formed last year,
Rene forced the pace of independence. His party, the Seychelles
People's United Party, has strong labor support and is leftist
in orientation.
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I The Seychelles will maintain close ties with the UK.
It will become a member of the Commonwealth and will be the
recipient of considerable British aid, including budgetary sup-
port and technical assistance.
I The new government also hopes to retain its links
with Paris. France once ruled the islands, and French cultural
influence is still strong, especially among the numerically
dominant Creoles.
Relations
between the US and the Seychelles gov-
■
ernment have been good.
US naval ships have visited the capital, and a few
US Peace Corps volunteers assist in educational and agricultural
projects. A US consulate was opened in May.
Both the Soviets and the Chinese will probably try to
gain influence in the Seychelles by providing limited financial
or technical assistance and establishing small diplomatic
missions .
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Seychelles officials have visited Moscow and Peking,
ana a Boviet delegation has visited the islands. Mancham is
likely to remain wary of the Soviets, however, because of sup-
port they have provided to Rene's party.
Domestic Scene
I The drive for independence gained momentum in 1971,
when Rene aggressively took up the cause with political assis-
tance from the Organization of African Unity. Mancham and his
party had advocated continued crown colony status, but came out
in favor of independence just before the 1974 elections.
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In the election, Mancham's Democratic Party received
52 percent of the vote, but won 13 of the 15 seats in the legis-
lative assembly. Rene's People's United Party won over 47 per-
cent of the popular vote, but lost three of its five seats. The
incongruous result created considerable resentment among opposi-
tion activists, who staged violent demonstrations.
Despite their differences, Mancham and Rene agreed at
constitutional talks in London last year to an interim consti-
tution and to the formation of a coalition cabinet of eight
members from the Democratic Party and four from Rene's group.
They also agreed that each party would name five new members
to the legislature. Mancham apparently made the concessions
to avert a walk-out by Rene that might have delayed indepen-
dence.
iRene and other leaders of the People's United Party,
part, are probably not reconciled to their minority
for their
role. They'may pu ^sh for a greater voice in government or for
early elections.
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RHODESIA
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I Mozambican troops apparently are taking more aggres-
sive action against Rhodesian security forces in response to
crossborder operations by the Rhodesians.
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— — I Earlier this month, the Mozambicans fired mortars
and rockets across Rhodesia’s southeastern border on three
separate occasions. At least one of the attacks provoked a re
taiiatory Rhodesian air strike on Mozambican territory.
I |Last Friday some 250 white settlers met at Chipinqa,
near the southeastern border, to demand that Rhodesian govern-
ment leaders take stronger measures to stop rocket attacks
from Mozambique. The Rhodesian defense minister reportedly told
the settlers that retaliatory strikes into Mozambique might be
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YUGOSLAVIA: European Communist Meeting
I Yugoslav President Tito has decided to participate in
the European Communist Party Conference in East Berlin on Tues-
day and Wednesday, his first participation in such a meeting.
He undoubtedly hopes that the conference will formally vindicate
his once-heretical views on "separate roads" to Communism.
As late as June 7, Tito reportedly did not plan to
attend the conference. Soviet concessions, made after Soviet
party secretary Katushev's talks in Belgrade, apparently led
Tito to believe that his own independent position in the movement
would finally be accepted at a multiparty forum.
Several recent accounts of conference preparations
suggest that Moscow has abandoned its efforts to reassert leader-
ship of the movement at the conference.
The Soviets have alternated between conciliation and
tougnness throughout the preparations. Tito's decision to risk
his prestige by going to East Berlin suggests that he believes
Moscow will not raise controversial substantive issues. If it
does, however, Tito and his delegation will not sit by passively.
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the first
f erence .
Tito and General Secretary Brezhnev yesterday became
foreign leaders to arrive in East Berlin for the con-
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INTERNATIONAL TIN COUNCIL
don ,
. The International Tin Council, now meeting in Lon-
is likely to agree on a new accord designed to stabilize
prices and supplies through management of a buffer stock, but
not until Bolivia gives its reluctant approval. Enough votes
for a new agreement appear to be available from consumer coun-
tries, but Bolivia is needed for the required number of producer-
country votes .
Because Bolivia — the world's second largest tin
producer— -has a generally inefficient, high— cost industry,
often plagued by strikes, it is agitating for high prices.
Bolivia also opposes the tin council's voting system and, in
particular, the heavy voting strength of the US among the con-
sumers .
I Some major producers, such as Malaysia, probably
welcome US participation. In the interest of maintaining high
prices, they hope for continued US restraint in disposing of
its huge tin stockpile.
Although considerable wrangling is expected, compro-
mise will probably smooth the resolution of the various issues-
including the most contentious one, that of selecting a new
Council head. It seems unlikely tljia t Bolivia will bolt the or-
ganization as earlier threatened.
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NEPAL-CHINA
I I Peking went all out to make Nepalese King _ Birendra | s
recent visit to China a major success. He was the first foreign
dignitary permitted to visit Tibet since the Chinese take-over
there in 1959, and Premier Hua Kuo-feng and other high-level
Chinese officials made the unprecedented gesture of flying to
distant Szechwan Province to welcome the royal party.
I //The special treatment clearly reflects the effort
the Chinese are making— in advance of the imminent arrival in
Peking of the first Indian ambassador to China in 15 years--to
reassure old friends in South Asia that Sino-Indian normaliza-
tion will not proceed at their expense.//
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//The Himalayan buffer states have always been a
sensitive area in Sino-Indian relations, and Nepal, which has
traditionally sought a middle path between its powerful neigh-
bors and has relied on China as a source of some economic
assistance, certainly qualifies for extra attention in this
regard . //
//Peking undoubtedly also viewed the King's visit
as a prime opportunity to strengthen indirectly the hand of those
in Nepal who oppose Prime Minister Giri's pro-India foreign pol-
icy. The Chinese have been dismayed at the pro-India direction
to India; the King's decision was apparently taken without con-
sulting the Prime Minister. Giri is rumored to have threatened
to resign over what he saw as a campaign to sabotage his author-
ity .
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year .
When Peking tendered its invitation, the King's ad-
Even before the King's visit, rumors were circulating
in Nepal that Giri was in bad odor and would be replaced by the
end of the year, probably by former prime minister Bista.
Bista traveled to Peking in mid-May, intending to pay
a private visit to relatives serving with the Nepalese embassy,
but the Chinese afforded him all the protocol normally reserved
for important foreign office holders. The Chinese enjoyed smooth
relations with Nepal during Bista 's earlier tenure as prime min-
ister and ma y have been trying to boost his candi dacy as Giri's
repalcement .
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Top secret
(Security Classification)
Top Secret
(Security 2006/03/17 : CIA-RDP79T00975A02900001 0048-7